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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Lawrence Olson appeals from the denial, after an evidentiary hearing, of
his petition for post-conviction relief.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
Olson filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction for
felony DUI.

Olson v. State, 2012 Unpublished Opinion No. 398, Docket No.

38042, at p. 2 (Idaho App., March 9, 2012) (copy attached as Appendix). "Olson
alleged numerous errors and constitutional violations in the underlying criminal
proceedings, including allegations that his confession was illegally obtained, his
guilty plea was coerced and given under duress, he received ineffective
assistance of counsel, defense counsel had a material conflict of interest, and the
persistent violator statute is overbroad and unconstitutionally vague."
also filed a motion for appointment of counsel.

&

19..c Olson

The district court dismissed

this petition "as to all claims save that regarding ineffective assistance of
counsel" and appointed counsel to represent Olson on the remaining claim.

19..c

The matter proceeded to an evidentiary hearing, at which all remaining claims
were denied.

&

The Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of claims at the

evidentiary hearing, but reversed the summary dismissal of claims prior to
appointment of counsel, and remanded for further proceedings.

&

at pp. 5-6, 9.

On remand the district court set the dismissed claims for an evidentiary
hearing. (5/2/12 Tr., p. 1, L. 16- p. 2, L. 14.) Counsel asked that the hearing be
set "90 days out" but the district court set it for June 15, which was 43 days from
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the May 2, 2012 status conference. (5/2/12 Tr., p. 3, L. 3 - p. 4, L. 11.) At the
scheduled evidentiary hearing Olson's counsel indicated Olson "would like more
time to prepare," but acknowledged that he, counsel, was "prepared" to "move
forward in terms of developing evidence" that day. (6/15/12 Tr., p. 12, L. 1 - p.
13, L. 13.) Olson then testified in support of the claims in his original petition.
(6/15/12 Tr., p. 31, L. 1 - p. 94, L. 24.) The district court thereafter denied relief.
(6/15/12 Tr., p. 94, L. 25 - p. 97, L. 12; R., pp. 13-14.) Olson timely appealed.
(R., pp. 17-23.)
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ISSUES

Olson states the issues on appeal as:
1.

Whether the district court erred by not affording Mr. Olson
sufficient time to discuss his potential claims with postconviction counsel so that he might develop them into viable
post-conviction claims, which was the point of the Court of
Appeals' decision to remand this case following the initial,
inappropriate summary dismissal of those claims?

2.

Whether the district court erroneously summarily dismissed
Mr. Olson's petition for post-conviction relief in the face of at
least one genuine issue of material fact?

(Appellant's brief, p. 7.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.

At the status conference following remand Olson's counsel requested 90
days to prepare for the evidentiary hearing, but the district court denied
the request and set the hearing 43 days later. Is Olson's claim that this
setting denied him the assistance of counsel frivolous?

2.

Olson claims that the district court erroneously denied his claims after an
evidentiary hearing because there remained "a genuine issue of material
fact." Because Olson's petition was denied after an evidentiary hearing, is
this issue also frivolous?
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ARGUMENT

I.
Olson's Claim He Was Denied The Assistance Of Counsel Because The District
Court Set The Evidentiary Hearing 43 Days From The Status Conference Instead
Of 90 Or More Is Frivolous
A.

Introduction
At the status conference following remand Olson's trial counsel requested

90 days to prepare for the evidentiary hearing but the district court denied that
request and scheduled the hearing for 43 days later. (5/2/12 Tr., p. 1, L. 16 - p.
4, L. 15. 1) On appeal Olson asserts the district court did not "afford Mr. Olson a
sufficient opportunity to discuss his claims with post-conviction counsel so that
counsel could assist him in the prosecution of those claims." (Appellant's brief, p.
9.) This claim is frivolous.

B.

Standard Of Review
The decision to grant or deny a continuance rests within the sound

discretion of the trial court. State v. Nunez, 133 Idaho 13, 21,981 P.2d 738,746
(1999); State v. Hudson, 129 Idaho 478,481,927 P.2d 451,454 (Ct. App. 1996).
"Unless an appellant shows that his substantial rights have been prejudiced by
reason of a denial of his motion for continuance, appellate courts can only

The district court did not schedule the entire evidentiary hearing at that time.
Rather, the court expressed a desire to have Olson present evidence in support
of his claim at an initial hearing and then have the state present its case at a
subsequent hearing should there be a need for such evidence. (5/2/12 Tr., p. 1,
L. 16 - p. 2, L. 1; p. 2, L. 24 - p. 3, L. 1; p. 4, Ls. 5-11; see also 6/15/12 Tr., p. 9,
Ls. 13-22.) The court indicated that Olson would also be given the opportunity to
present additional evidence if the evidence presented at the hearing established
such a need. (6/15/12 Tr., p. 13, Ls. 1-13; p. 17, Ls. 7-21; p. 28, L. 19- p. 29, L.
9.)
1
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conclude that there was no abuse of discretion." Nunez, 133 Idaho 13, 21, 981
P.2d 738, 746 (1999) (citing State v. Laws, 94 Idaho 200,203,485 P.2d 144, 147
(1971)).

See also State v. Evans, 129 Idaho 758, 762, 932 P.2d 881, 885

(1997); State v. Hudson, 129 Idaho 478,481,927 P.2d 451,454 (Ct. App. 1996).

C.

Olson's Appellate Claim That 43 Days Was Insufficient Time To Confer
With Counsel Is Frivolous
"Trial judges necessarily require a great deal of latitude in scheduling

trials." State v. Carman, 114 Idaho 791, 793, 760 P.2d 1207 (Ct. App. 1988)
(quoted in State v. Cagle, 126 Idaho 794, 797, 891 P.2d 1054, 1057 (Ct. App.
1995)).

To show an abuse of scheduling discretion the appellant must

demonstrate that his substantial rights were prejudiced by having to proceed to
trial as scheduled.

See Evans, 129 Idaho at 762, 932 P.2d at 885 (denial of

motion to continue trial).
Olson asserts that the substantial right he was deprived of was the
statutory right to counsel, because 43 days was, apparently as a matter of law,
inadequate time to prepare for the hearing. (Appellant's brief, pp. 8-14.) Review
of the cases cited by Olson, and the parts of the record inexplicably omitted by
him, shows no denial of the right to counsel and, therefore, no prejudice to a
substantial right.
Olson first cites January v. State, 127 Idaho 634, 903 P.2d 1331 (Ct. App.
1995).

January claimed that three days was inadequate notice of an

administrative jurisdictional review rebuttal hearing conducted by the Idaho
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Department of Correction.

kl at 638,

903 P.2d at 1335. 2 The Court of Appeals

rejected this due process claim on the basis that January had been provided
notice that more time would be given if requested and January did not request
more time.

kl

The next case cited by Olson is Hawk v. Olson, 326 U.S. 271 (1945). In
that case a murder trial was scheduled to start immediately after arraignment and
the trial court denied the defendant's request for a 24 hour continuance to consult
with counsel before trial.

kl

at 277.

Under the alleged circumstances the

defendant "had no advice of counsel prior to the calling of the jury."

kl

at 278.

The Court held that "denial of opportunity to consult with counsel on any material
step after indictment or similar charge and arraignment violates the Fourteenth
Amendment."

kl3

The parallels between this case and January and Hawk are nonexistent.
In this case there was 43 days from the status conference for an attorney who
had been involved in the case for months (if not years) to prepare for an
evidentiary hearing.

In January and Hawk there was three days to prepare

The Court of Appeals also rejected January's claim that he was denied the right
to counsel because he had no such right for a hearing conducted by the
Department of Correction. January, 127 Idaho at 638, 903 P.2d at 1335.
2

Olson also cites the dissent from an order denying a petition for certiorari, in
Brascia v. New Jersey, 417 U.S. 921 (1974). In that case the trial court had, the
morning of the first day of trial, granted withdrawal by the member of the public
defender's office assigned the case but ordered another member of that office
unfamiliar with the case to handle the trial over that lawyer's protests that he was
unprepared.
3
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(which was sufficient) and zero days to consult with counsel before trial (which
was not sufficient). The January and Hawk opinions in no way support the claim
that 43 days to prepare for the evidentiary hearing was in any was deficient,
much less deficient such as to deny Olson the statutory right to counsel.
Olson's claim is also not supported by the record. Omitted from Olson's
brief are citations to at least two separate representations by Olson's postconviction trial counsel that he was ready to proceed with the hearing. (6/15/12
Tr., p. 11, Ls.16-17 ("Judge, I'm prepared to proceed."); p. 13, Ls. 10-13 ("I think
as far as I understood the Court's desire to move forward in terms of developing
evidence today, I'm prepared to do that.").)

Also omitted is counsel's

representation that he had investigated the claims, prior to the appeal, in relation
to his decision to file an amended petition. (6/15/12 Tr., p. 27, L. 16 - p. 28, L.
18.) Finally, omitted from Olson's brief is any acknowledgement that the district
court specifically found that Olson's counsel was ready to proceed. (6/15/12 Tr.,
p. 29, Ls. 2-9.)
Olson's personal request to the district court for additional time centered
not around his attorney's preparation (his attorney repeatedly claimed he was
prepared) but around his assertion that he had not had time to re-read the
petition and all the transcripts because he had lost some of his documents in
prison transfers. (6/15/12 p. 12, L. 25 - p. 13, L. 13; p. 31, L. 22 - p. 32, L. 12;
see Appellant's brief, pp. 9-10 (court did not afford "Mr. Olson" enough time).)
Because the record shows that the basis for Olson's motion for more time was
for Olson to read additional documents and not for additional time for counsel to
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prepare, and further shows that counsel repeatedly stated he was prepared for
the evidentiary hearing, Olson's appellate claim he was denied the right to
counsel is directly contrary to the record.
On appeal Olson has failed to show any law supporting a claim that 43
days is per se inadequate time to prepare for a post-conviction evidentiary
hearing, and any claim that counsel was in fact not prepare is unsupportable in
light of counsel's repeated assurances to the contrary. Review of the law cited in
Olson's brief and the portions of the record omitted therefrom show his claim to
be frivolous.

11.
Olson's Argument That The District Court Erred In Denying His Petition Because
His Evidence At The Evidentiary Hearing Created A "Genuine Issue Of Fact" Is
Frivolous

A

Introduction
The district court entered its order denying relief on the petition "following

an evidentiary hearing." (R., p. 13.) Olson argues the order denying relief is
"properly classified as summary dismissals, not denials after an evidentiary
hearing." (Appellant's brief, p. 17. 4) The basis for this argument is that the court
stated it was not hearing all the evidence at the scheduled hearing, but that there
would be an additional hearing for any claims sufficiently established by the

Olson's assertion that the hearing was merely on the question of summary
dismissal makes his claim that 43 days was insufficient time to prepare even less
credible. Olson apparently believes that the hearing was an evidentiary hearing
on the petition for purposes of his first issue but merely a hearing on summary
dismissal for his second. The state is consistent with its argument, however: the
hearing was an evidentiary hearing on the merits of the petition, not merely a
proceeding on summary dismissal.
4
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evidence presented at the scheduled hearing. (Id.) Thus, contends Olson, the
proper legal standard is whether the evidence he presented at the hearing was
sufficient to avoid summary dismissal, and one of the claims was supported by
sufficient evidence to create a material issue of fact. (Appellant's brief, pp. 1419.) This claim lacks merit. Review of the record shows merely that the district
court bifurcated the evidentiary hearing and required Olson to present sufficient
evidence to prove his claims before contrary evidence would be taken. Olson's
claim that the court held an evidentiary hearing on a nonexistent motion instead
of the petition is not supported by the record.

B.

Standard Of Review
A petitioner seeking post-conviction relief has the burden of proving, by a

preponderance of the evidence, the allegations upon which his claim is based.
Estes v. State, 111 Idaho 430, 436, 725 P.2d 135, 141 (1986); Clark v. State, 92
Idaho 827, 830, 452 P.2d 54, 57 (1969); I.C.R. 57(c). When the district court
conducts an evidentiary hearing and enters findings of fact and conclusions of
law, an appellate court will disturb the findings of fact only if they are clearly
erroneous, but will freely review the conclusions of law drawn by the district court
from those facts. Mitchell v. State, 132 Idaho 274, 276-77, 971 P.2d 727, 729730 (1998).

The credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be given to their

testimony, and the inferences to be drawn from the evidence are all matters
solely within the province of the district court. Peterson v. State, 139 Idaho 95,
97, 73 P.3d 108, 110 (Ct. App. 2003).

9

A trial court's decision that a post-

conviction petitioner has not met his burden of proof is entitled to great weight.
Sanders v. State, 117 Idaho 939,940, 792 P.2d 964,965 (Ct. App. 1990).

C.

The Record Shows The Court Ordered A Bifurcated Evidentiary Hearing,
Not A Hearing On Summary Dismissal To Be Followed By An Evidentiary
Hearing
At the status conference following remand the district court stated it was

"simply going to set it for hearing." (5/2/12 Tr., p. 1, Ls. 16-19.) Because the
only "it" pending was the petition (there was neither a motion for summary
dismissal nor a notice of intent to dismiss extant at that time), the district court
unambiguously ordered an evidentiary hearing.
The district court then determined that the way it wanted to proceed was
to "let the petitioner go forward at a hearing" and then, "dependant on the
outcome of that and the court's ruling" a second hearing would be set "if the
State chooses to present any evidence." (5/2/12 Tr., p. 1, L. 16 - p. 2, L. 1.) At
the conclusion of the conference the Court reiterated:
So just - we'll let [Olson] put on [his] evidence. And
depending what comes from that, whether or not the court - if
there's a need for the State to submit rebuttal evidence - not
rebuttal evidence, but to submit any evidence to the contrary, well,
then, we'll have a later hearing at a later date. But we'll let the
petitioner put on his evidence the morning of June 15th •
(5/2/12 Tr., p. 4, Ls. 5-11 (emphasis added).)

Although there was some

discussion at the hearing of what claims were left to litigate, the comments by
both counsel and the Court at the evidentiary hearing are consistent with the
understanding that the June 15 hearing was the evidentiary hearing for Olson to
present evidence of his claims and that another hearing would be ordered only if
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there was a need to allow the state to present contrary evidence. (6/15/12 Tr., p.
8, L. 11 - p. 29, L. 11.) At the conclusion of the hearing the court found that the
claims had been submitted to the court "in their entirety" and that Olson had
failed to establish his claims "by a preponderance of the evidence." (6/15/12 Tr.,
p. 96, Ls. 9-24.)
The record establishes that the court held an evidentiary hearing for Olson
to present the evidence supporting his claims. At the conclusion of the hearing
the court found the matter fully submitted and the evidence insufficient to prove
the claims by a preponderance. Olson's argument that the hearing was merely
one for summary dismissal, when no such motion was pending, is contrary to the
record. His acknowledgment that his evidence only created a material issue of
fact on one issue, and his failure to claim he proved any of his claims by a
preponderance of the evidence, shows the lack of merit in his claim of error.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court's
holding that Olson failed to prove his claims by a preponderance of the evidence
after an evidentiary hearing.

DATED this 1st day of July, 2013.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 1st day of July, 2013, served a true
and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a copy
addressed to:
BRIAN R. DICKSON
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho
Supreme Court Clerk's office.

KKJ/pm
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
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Docket No. 38042
LAWREN CE JOSEPH OLSON,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.

STA TE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

O ~l

ZOlZ

ATTORNEY GENERAL
DIVISION

2012 Unpublished Opinion No. 398
Filed: March 9, 2012
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk
THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED
OPINION AND SHALL NOT
BE CITED AS AUTHORITY

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada
County. Hon. Michael R. McLaughlin, District Judge.
Order dismissing original petition for post-conviction relief, reversed and case
remanded; order granting partial summary dismissal of first amended petition for
post-conviction relief, affi1111ed.
Sara B. Thomas, State Appellate Public Defender; Elizabeth Ann Allred, Deputy
Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Kenneth K. Jorgensen, Deputy
Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.
GUTIERREZ, Judge
Lawrence Joseph Olson appeals from the district couti's order dismissing his original
petition for post-conviction relief. Olson contends the district court failed to rnle on Olson's
motion for appointment of counsel prior to rnling on the merits of his claims and failed to
provide Olson with the required notice of its intent to dismiss. Olson also appeals from the
district comi's order granting paiiial summary dismissal of his first amended petition for postconviction relief, arguing the district comi also failed to provide him with the required notice of
its intent to dismiss when it dismissed two of his claims on grounds other than those given in the
State's motion for summary dismissal. For the reasons set forth below, we reverse in regard to
the original petition and remand the case for fmiher proceedings, and we affirm in regard to the
first amended petition.

I.

FACTS AND PROCEDURE
In 2008, Olson pled guilty to felony driving under the influence (DUI) and being a
persistent violator and was sentenced to a unified life term, with seven years determinate. After
obtaining no relief on direct appeal, in May 2009, Olson filed an original pro se petition for
post-conviction relief, an affidavit in support, and a motion for appointment of counsel. Olson
alleged numerous en-ors and constitutional violations in the underlying criminal proceedings,
including allegations that his confession was illegally obtained, his guilty plea was coerced and
given under duress, he received ineffective assistance of counsel, defense counsel had a material
conflict of interest, and the persistent violator statute is overbroad and unconstitutionally vague.
The State filed an answer to the original petition without also filing a motion for
summary dismissal. Without ruling on Olson's motion for appointment of counsel and without
providing Olson the required notice of its intent to dismiss, the district court sua sponte
dismissed the original petition as to all claims save that regarding ineffective assistance of
counsel and granted Olson leave to amend regarding that claim only. Olson then filed a first
amended petition for post-conviction relief, to which the State responded with a motion for
summary dismissal. Olson filed a response and again requested appointment of counsel, which
the district comt granted. After a hearing on the State's motion for summary dismissal of the
first amended petition, the district court granted the State's motion as to all but one claim. The
district comt again granted Olson leave to amend his petition, giving him twenty days to plead
with more specificity the claim that defense counsel failed to info1m Olson of his right to remain
silent in relation to sentencing.
Olson, through his post-conviction counsel, filed a second amended petition for postconviction relief. He alleged that defense counsel provided ineffective assistance because of the
lack of advice in regards to Olson's right to remain silent in relation to sentencing and because
other actions by defense counsel rendered his plea involuntaty. After an evidentiary hearing,
these claims were denied. Olson timely appeals, asking this Court to reverse the district court's
order of dismissal as to the original petition and the dismissal of the two claims in his first
amended petition, reinstate the original petition, and remand the case.
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II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A petition for post-conviction relief initiates a civil, rather than criminal, proceeding,
governed by the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. State v. Yakovac, 145 Idaho 437,443, 180 P.3d
476, 482 (2008); see also Pizzuto v. State, 146 Idaho 720, 724, 202 P.3d 642, 646 (2008). Like
the plaintiff in a civil action, the petitioner must prove by a preponderance of evidence the
allegations upon which the request for post-conviction relief is based. Idaho Code § 19-4907;

Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho 865, 869, 801 P.2d 1216, 1220 (1990); Goodwin v. State, 138 Idaho
269, 271, 61 P.3d 626, 628 (Ct. App. 2002). However, a petition for post-conviction relief
"differs from a complaint in an ordinary civil action[.]" Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 56, 106
P.3d 376, 382 (2004) (quoting Goodwin, 138 Idaho at 271, 61 P.3d at 628)). The petition must
contain much more than "a short and plain statement of the claim" that would suffice for a
complaint under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(l). State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 560, 199
P.3d 123, 135 (2008); Goodwin, 138 Idaho at 271, 61 P.3d at 628. The petition must be verified
with respect to facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner, and affidavits, records or
other evidence supporting its allegations must be attached, or the petition must state why such
supp01ting evidence is not included with the petition.

LC. § 19-4903. In other words, the

petition must present or be accompanied by admissible evidence supporting its allegations, or the
petition will be subject to dismissal.
Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of a petition for post-conviction
relief, either pursuant to motion of a paiiy or upon the court's own initiative. Summary dismissal
of a petition is the procedural equivalent of summary judgment under Idaho Rule of Civil
Procedure 56. A claim for post-conviction relief will be subject to summary dismissal if the
petitioner "has not presented evidence making a prima facie case as to each essential element of
the claims upon which the applicant bears the burden of proof." DeRushe v. State, 146 Idaho
599, 603, 200 P.3d 1148, 1152 (2009) (quoting Berg v. State, 131 Idaho 517, 518, 960 P.2d 738,
739 (1998)). Thus, summary dismissal is permissible when the petitioner's evidence has raised
no genuine issue of material fact that, if resolved in the petitioner's favor, would entitle the
petitioner to the requested relief. If such a factual issue is presented, an evidentiary hearing must
be conducted. Payne, 146 Idaho at 561, 199 P.3d at 136; Goodwin, 138 Idaho at 272, 61 P.3d at
629.

Summary dismissal of an application for post-conviction relief may be appropriate,
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however, even where the State does not controvert the petitioner's evidence because the court is
not required to accept either the petitioner's mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by
admissible evidence, or the petitioner's conclusions oflaw. Payne, 146 Idaho at 561, 199 P.3d at
136; Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644,647, 873 P.2d 898,901 (Ct. App. 1994). "When reviewing
a district com1' s order of summary dismissal in a post-conviction relief proceeding, we apply the
same standard as that applied by the district court." Ridgley v. State, 148 Idaho 671, 675, 227
P.3d 925, 929 (2010). On review of dismissal of a post-conviction relief petition without an
evidentiary hearing, we determine whether a genuine issue of material fact exists based on the
pleadings, depositions and admissions, together with any affidavits on file. Rhoades v. State,
148 Idaho 247, 220 P.3d 1066 (2009); Ricca v. State, 124 Idaho 894, 896, 865 P.2d 985, 987 (Ct.
App. 1993). However, "while the underlying facts must be regarded as true, the petitioner's
conclusions need not be so accepted." Rhoades, 148 Idaho at 250, 220 P.3d at 1069 (quoting
Phillips v. State, 108 Idaho 405,407, 700 P.2d 27, 29 (1985)); see also Hayes v. State, 146 Idaho
353, 355, 195 P.3d 712, 714 (Ct. App. 2008). As the trial court rather than a jury will be the trier
of fact in the event of an evidentiary hearing, summary dismissal is appropriate where the
evidentiary facts are not disputed, despite the possibility of conflicting inferences to be drawn
from the facts, for the comi alone will be responsible for resolving the conflict between those
inferences. Yakovac, 145 Idaho at 444, 180 P.3d at 483; Hayes, 146 Idaho at 355, 195 P.3d at
714. That is, the judge in a post-conviction action is not constrained to draw inferences in favor
of the party opposing the motion for summary disposition, but rather is free to an·ive at the most
probable inferences to be drawn from uncontroverted evidentiary facts. Hayes, 146 Idaho at 355,
195 P.3d at 714.
III.

DISCUSSION

Olson presents three issues on appeal. First, Olson argues the district court erred by
failing to rule on his motion for appointment of counsel before ruling on the merits in the
original petition. Next, Olson argues the district ened by failing to provide Olson notice of its
intent to dismiss the claims in his original petition, Finally, Olson asserts the district court erred
by granting dismissal of two claims in his first amended petition because it dismissed on grounds
other than those asserted by the State in its motion for summary dismissal and did not give Olson
notice of its intent to sua sponte dismiss those claims.
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A.

The Original Petition
Olson's first two issues on appeal are in regards to the district court's treatment of

Olson's original petition. As Olson asserts, without ruling on the motion for appointment of
counsel and without providing Olson the required notice of its intent to dismiss, the district coutt
sua sponte dismissed the original petition as to all claims except one.
If a post-conviction petitioner is unable to pay for the expenses of representation, the trial
com1 may appoint counsel to represent the petitioner in preparing the petition, in the trial comt
and on appeal. I.C. § 19-4904. The decision to grant or deny a motion for comt-appointed
counsel lies within the discretion of the district court. Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 792,
102 P.3d 1 I 08, 1 I 11 (2004). Importantly, here, when a district comt is presented with a motion
for appointed counsel, the comt must address this motion before ruling on the substantive issues
in the case. Id. The district comt abuses its discretion where it fails to determine whether a
petitioner for post-conviction relief is entitled to court-appointed counsel before denying the
petition on the merits. See id. at 793, 102 P.3d at 1112.
In deciding whether to appoint counsel, a district court should consider that petitions filed
by a prose applicant may be conclusory and incomplete. See id. at 792, 102 P.3d at 1111. Facts
sufficient to state a claim may not be alleged because they do not exist or because the pro se
petitioner does not know the essential elements of a claim. Id. Some claims are so patently
frivolous that they could not be developed into viable claims even with the assistance of counsel.
Newman v. State, 140 Idaho 491, 493, 95 P.3d 642, 644 (Ct. App. 2004).

However, if a

petitioner alleges facts that raise the possibility of a valid claim, the district court should appoint
counsel in order to provide the petitioner an opportunity to work with counsel and properly
allege the necessary supporting facts. Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 793, 102 P.3d at 1112.
The district court here failed to abide by the dictates of our Supreme Comt m
Charboneau that the motion for appointment of counsel be addressed before any decision on the

merits of the petition. The district court attempted to rule that the issues as pied in the original
petition were not valid; but the district court failed to engage in any analysis of whether,
regardless of their merit as pled, any of the issues could be developed into potentially meritorious
claims. In other words, the district court did not determine whether the claims were so patently
frivolous that they could not be developed into viable claims even with the assistance of counsel.
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See Newman, 140 Idaho at 493, 95 P.3d at 644. We decline to make that determination for the

first time on appeal.
The district com1 further erred in dismissing the claims in the original petition, other than
those dealing with ineffective assistance of counsel, without first providing notice to Olson of its
intent to dismiss. Such notice may be provided in one of two ways. The district court may
provide a petitioner notice of its intent to dismiss, state the ground or grounds upon which the
claim is to be dismissed, and provide twenty days for the petitioner to respond.
19-4906(b).

LC. §

Alternatively, the State may file and serve a properly suppo1ied motion for

summary dismissal and, ordinarily, no further notice from the comt is required because the
motion itself serves as notice that dismissal is being sought. I. C. § 19-4906(c); Saykhamchone v.
State, 127 Idaho 319, 322, 900 P.2d 795, 798 (1995). No notice was provided prior to the

dismissal in this case. Notice to a petitioner allows the petitioner an opportunity to correct
deficiencies in a conclusory or incomplete petition and have an oppo1tunity to allege additional
facts, raising the possibility of a valid claim before the cou1t dismisses the petition. Swader v.
State, 143 Idaho 651, 653-54, 152 P.3d 12, 14-15 (2007). Thus, not only did the district court

fail to determine whether any of the claims could be developed, with the assistance of counsel
into potentially meritorious claims, Olson was given no opportunity to conect any deficiencies in
the petition, with or without the assistance of counsel prior to dismissal. Consequently, to the
extent Olson's claims in his original petition were not addressed in the first amended petition
(discussed below) or in the second amended petition (which resolved the claims therein at an
evidentiary hearing), the dismissal of such claims is reversed and remanded to the district comt
for determination consistent with the procedure as set fo1th above.

B.

The First Amended Petition
Olson also argues a lack of notice in the district comt's dismissal of two claims in his

first amended petition because it dismissed the claims on grounds other than those asse1ted in the
State's motion for summary dismissal of the first amended petition. The State contends the
district court dismissed the two claims in the first amended petition on grounds not different in
kind from those the State asserted in its motion for summary dismissal and, consequently, no
additional notice was required.
Where the cot111 dismisses a petition on grounds different from those asserted in a motion
for summary disposition flied by the State, it does so on its own initiative and must provide
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twenty days' notice. Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 524, 164 P.3d 798, 804 (2007); Gibbs v.

State, 103 Idaho 758, 760, 653 P.2d 813, 815 (Ct. App. 1982). Yet, when the district court
summarily dismisses a post-conviction petition relying in part on the same grounds presented by
the State in its motion for summary dismissal, the notice requirement has been met. Workman,
144 Idaho at 524, 164 P.3d at 804; Buss v. State, 147 Idaho 514,517,211 P.3d 123, 126 (Ct.
App. 2009). Where there is significant overlap between the reasoning of the district court and
the State's asserted grounds supporting its motion for summary dismissal, the district court's
grounds will not be so different in kind as to transform the decision into a sua sponte dismissal
requiring notice. Buss, 147 Idaho at 517,211 P.3d at 126.
In this case, Olson asserts the district court granted dismissal as to claims C and Gin the
first amended petition for reasons other than the State asserted in its motion for summary
dismissal on those claims. In claim C, Olson alleged his counsel had a conflict of interest in that
counsel was employed by the Ada County Prosecutor's Office and also that counsel failed to
present issues raised by "Butch Shotwell," which Olson had requested of her. In its motion for
summary dismissal, the State argued:
The Petitioner fails to present evidence to establish this [claim]. Clearly, his trial
counsel neither is at the present time, nor was she, employed by the Ada County
Prosecutor's Office ....
He also argues that issues raised by "Butch Shotwell" were not presented.
He does not state what issues should have been raised or what prejudice resulted
from this alleged failure.
In its order, the district court dismissed the claim "because Petitioner has not specified ... the
alleged conflict of interest. All of the public defenders are employed by Ada County. That, in
and of itself, does not create a conflict of interest." The court also concluded "there has been
nothing specified as to issues raised by 'Butch Shotwell."' Both the State and the district comi
addressed counsel's place of employment: the State by pointing out the fallacy of Olson's
argument and the district comi by clarifying that being employed by Ada County does not create
a conflict in and of itself, In other words, Olson alleged nothing that would substantiate his
claim, i.e. a failure to present evidence. The rationale of the district court was not so different in
kind as to require twenty days' notice to Olson. As to the claim regarding Butch Shotwell,
"nothing specified" is simply a different way of wording "he does not state." The district court
was not required to provide further notice of its intent to dismiss this claim.
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Olson's allegations in claim G included, "Counsel was negligent in performing her duties
as counsel in court when petitioner tried talking to her about his rights and was told to be quiet
by the cou1i security and petitioners [sic] counsel." In its motion for summary dismissal the
State responded, "[Olson] has not established prejudice and how the outcome in this case would
be different even if this were true. The Advisory indicates he understood his rights from this
Comi." In the order of dismissal the district comi found, "The Petitioner has not alluded to any
specific evidence as to if or how he was threatened about speaking or communicating with the
Court."

The State's ground speaks to Olson's burden of showing prejudice in alleging

ineffective assistance of counsel, as is required for such a claim to remain viable and survive
summary dismissal. On the other hand, the district court's reasoning is based on whether Olson
was coerced, threatened, or placed under duress during court hearings. 1 We conclude the
grounds are different in kind and required notice by the district court prior to dismissal of the
claim.
However, no substantial right of Olson was affected by the lack of notice in the first
amended petition because Olson re-alleged, and the district court considered, the substantive
assetiions in claim G in the second amended petition. The procedural posture of this case and
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 61 instruct us that reversal in this particular factual circumstance
is not required. Rule 61 provides:
No enor ... in any ruling or order or in anything done or omitted by the court or
by any of the paities is ground for . , . vacating, modifying, or otherwise
disturbing a judgment or order unless refusal to take such action appears to the
court inconsistent with substantial justice. The court at every stage of the
proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which does not
affect the substantial rights of the parties.
The district comi granted leave to amend only as to the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
in relation to Olson's right to remain silent in sentencing matters.

However, in his second

amended petition, Olson also alleged that his guilty plea was not free and voluntary because of
the limited communicat~on between him and counsel, because of his belief that counsel had not
investigated defenses, and because he was "told to be quiet in court when he tried to ask his
attorney questions." The State made no objection, and the district court permitted this patticular
allegation to be addressed at the evidentiary hearing. Olson's defense counsel was a witness at

We assume the court hearings referenced refer to the plea hearing and sentencing.
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that hearing and answered questions specifically relating to Olson's allegations that he was told
to be quiet in court. Because Olson later had the opportunity to be heard on this claim, the
district court's dismissal of claim G in the first amended petition did not affect a substantial
right.

III.
CONCLUSION

We conclude the district comt abused its discretion by denying Olson's motion for
appointment of counsel because it did not rule on the motion prior to dismissal of claims in the
original petition and also by failing to provide any notice to Olson of its intent to dismiss, We
also conclude the district court dismissed claim C in the first amended petition on grounds not
different in kind from those asserted by the State in its motion for summary dismissal. We
further conclude, however, that claim G in the first amended petition was dismissed on different
grounds than those asserted by the State and required notice to Olson, but the error did not affect
a substantial right of Olson's because the claim was re-alleged and considered by the district
court in the second amended petition. Therefore, we reverse the order dismissing the original
petition and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We affirm the
order granting partial summary dismissal of the first amended petition.
Chief Judge GRATTON and Judge LANSING CONCUR.
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